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CREDIT RATING AGENCIES, STRUCTURED SECURITIES, 
AND THEW AY OUT OF THE ABYSS 
LOIS R. LUPICA1 
Bear in mind, however, that a rating is, in the end, an opznzon. The 
rating assignment is as much an art as it is a science. 2 
L Credit Rating Agencies and Credit Ratings 
Since the early twentieth century, credit rating agencies 
("CRAs") have provided opinions about the creditworthiness of 
securities issuers and the quality of their issuances. 3 An issuer's 
creditworthiness is a function of the risk that its loan instrument will 
1 Maine Law Foundation Professor of Law, University of Maine School of 
Law. B.S. Cornell University, 1981; J.D. Boston University School of Law, 
1987. 
2 STANDARD & POOR'S, CORPORATE RATINGS CRITERIA 3 (2008) 
(statement of Solomon B. Samson, Chief Rating Officer, Corporate 
Ratings). 
3 Standard & Poor's ("S&P") stated that 
[a] Standard & Poor's issuer credit rating is a current 
opinion of an obligor's overall financial capacity (its 
creditworthiness) to pay its financial obligations. This 
opinion focuses on the obligor's capacity and willingness 
to meet its financial commitments as they come due. It 
does not apply to any specific financial obligation, as it 
does not take into account the nature of and provisions of 
the obligation, its standing in bankruptcy or liquidation, 
statutory preferences, or the legality and enforceability of 
the obligation. In addition, it does not take into account 
the creditworthiness of the guarantors, insurers, or other 
forms of credit enhancement on the obligation. The issuer 
credit rating is not a recommendation to purchase, sell, or 
hold a financial obligation issued by an obligor, as it does 
not comment on market price or suitability for a particular 
investor. 
Standard & Poor's Ratings Definitions, Issuer Credit Rating Definitions, 
http://pages.stem.nyu.edu/~igiddy/ ABS/sandpratings.htm (last visited Mar. 
26, 2009). 
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decline in value as a result of its failure to satisfY the contractual 
terms of its borrowing arrangement. 4 Although the pronouncements 
of CRAs have enormous consequences for the financial markets, 
issuers and investors, until quite recently CRAs have operated 
largely unnoticed in the shadows of these markets. 5 
This obscurity ended with the relatively recent 
transformation of the financial markets. As increasing numbers of 
business borrowers began entering the securitization market­
financing their operations by securitizing their assets rather than by 
accessing more traditional sources of finance-the financial markets' 
landscape became dramatically and inexorably altered. 
Technological innovation coupled with financial wizardry fueled the 
rapid growth of the securitization markets, leading to increasingly 
high volume conversions of cash flows into complex securitized and 
collateralized debt instruments and their derivatives.6 A self­
4 See, e.g., TIMOTHY J. SINCLAIR, THE NEW MASTERS OF CAPITAL: 

AMERICAN BOND RATING AGENCIES AND THE POLITICS OF 

CREDITWORTHINESS 4 (2005) ("The higher the rating, the less [the] risk of 

default on repayment to the lender ...."). 

5 !d. at 1-2 ("Their arsenal is an occult one, largely invisible to all but a few 

most of the time."). 

6 Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, stated the 

following regarding technological innovation: 

The impact of information technology has been keenly 
felt in the fmancial sector of the economy. Perhaps the 
most significant innovation has been the development of 
financial instruments that enable risk to be reallocated to 
the parties most willing and able to bear that risk. Many of 
the new fmancial products that have been created, with 
fmancial derivatives being the most notable, contribute 
economic value by unbundling risks and shifting them in a 
highly calibrated manner. Although these instruments 
cannot reduce the risk inherent in real assets, they can 
redistribute it in a way that induces more investment in 
real assets and, hence, engenders higher productivity and 
standards of living. Information technology has made 
possible the creation, valuation, and exchange of these 
complex financial products on a global basis. 
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, The Revolution in Information 
Technology, Remarks Before the Boston College Conference on the New 
2009 CREDIT RATING AGENCIES & STRUCTURED SECURITIES 641 
reinforcing supply and demand cycle emerged, with investment 
banks and other participants in the securitized debt market creating a 
seemingly insatiable demand for the sale of asset-backed securities 
("ABSs"), mortgage-backed secuntles ("MBSs"), and other 
collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs"). 7 
With this insatiable demand for derivative instruments, 
investors correspondingly demanded accurate and timely information 
about the risks associated with investment in these securities. 
Accordingly, CRAs developed methodologies, models, and processes 
of analysis in order to provide opinions with respect to investment 
risks in these derivatives. 
During the securitization boom, CRAs' volume of business 
expanded ten-fold, and they, like all other financial market 
participants, became caught up in its exuberance. 8 The high volume 
of issuances, long runs of high yields, and the complexity of the 
investments all led to widespread over-dependence of investors on 
rating agencies to evaluate risk. 9 With the benefit of hindsight, it is 
Economy (Mar. 6, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve. 

gov/BoardDocs/Speeches/2000/20000306.htm). 

7 !d. (partially attributing the rise in the supply and demand of securitized 

fmancial instruments to the capacity of such instruments to redistribute risk 

in novel ways). 

8 Discussing the meltdown of the structured finance market, The Economist 

stated: 

Alongside the banks, the "gatekeepers" who were 
supposed to lend stability and credibility to the new 
originate-and-distribute model of finance have also been 
found wanting. Rating agencies' models underplayed the 
risk that loans from different lenders and regions could 
turn sour at the same time. Bond insurers, too, misjudged 
the risks lurking in CDOs. That failing has undermined 
the worth of their guarantees and strained their own credit 
ratings-and hence financial markets. 
Fear and Loathing, and a Hint of Hope, ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 2008, 
available at http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story _id 
=10689043. 
9 !d. (discussing the "breakneck growth" of securitization, and identifying 
such underlying flaws as "the sheer lack of understanding of some 
instruments" and "the market's over-reliance on ratings as a short cut to 
assessing risk"). 
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clear that such unbridled confidence in rating agencies' opinions was 
. 1 d 10m1sp ace . 
In 2008, the financial markets collapsed, and rating agencies 
were caught in the "conflagration." 11 The failure of the financial 
markets, attributed to "the collective misjudgment of risk; a zealous 
search for yield; and the failure of oversight,"12 has served to shine a 
spotlight on the activities of CRAs and to raise questions about the 
nature and scope of their authority and the financial implications of 
10 There were individuals, however, who recognized the large level of risk 
in the securitization market, even when the market was at its peak. See, e.g., 
Frederic Dannen, The Failed Promise of Asset-Backed Securities, 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 1989, at 261 (observing that market prices 
for ABS have not always been an accurate reflection of their credit­
enhanced quality); Gary Silverman, Debra Sparks & Andrew Osterland, A 
$2.5 Trillion Market You Hardly Know, Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 1998, at 123 
(observing that there is an "illusion of liquidity" in the ABS market which is 
leading to more expensive credit for originators, who in tum are passing the 
higher costs on to consumers); Gary Silverman, Commentary: Securitization 
is No Security Blanket, Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 1998, at 140 (finding that banks 
are securitizing safe loans and keeping the risky ones, thereby masking their 
true insolvency probability); Suzanne Woolley, What's Next, Bridge Tolls?, 
Bus. WK., Sept. 2, 1996, at 64 (quoting a rating agency managing director 
urging caution to ABS investors). 
11 The Economist eloquently described the situation: 
How do you fight a conflagration when smaller blazes 
erupt almost daily? ... Though the crisis is far from over, 
its causes have long been clear. Securitisation-the 
packaging of bank loans into tradable bonds-grew too 
complex. The incentives of those involved, especially loan 
originators, were warped. Lending standards plummeted 
as a result, not only in mortgages but in credit cards and 
corporate lending too. Investors over-reached for yield as 
interest rates fell. Everyone focused on credit ratings 
rather than the underlying credits. . . . Credit-rating 
agencies will be expected to distinguish more clearly 
between ratings for structured products and straight 
corporate debt, and to flag up conflicts of interest. 
Dousing the Fire, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 2008, available at http://www. 

economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=I0855889. 

12 Barbarians at the Vault, ECONOMIST, May 15, 2008, at 17. 
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their judgments. 13 The high profile incidences of CRAs "getting it 
wrong" have further triggered calls for greater scrutiny and oversight 
. . 14
over t he1r operatiOns. 
The deregulatory efforts of recent years have opened up new 
opportunities and prospects for many participants in the financial 
markets, including rating agencies. 15 However, this shifting 
landscape has also resulted in new disquiet and uncertainty, with 
initial unease evolving into fundamental questions about the 
legitimacy of the essentially unregulated credit rating industry. 16 
13 Until a few decades ago, credit rating was a stagnant business, offering 
little information beyond that which was already publicly available. Frank 
Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other 
Gatekeepers 63 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Stud. Res. Paper 
Series, Research Paper No. 07-46, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=900257 ("The rating business remained stagnant 
for decades."). Rating adjustments tended to lag behind by almost 18 
months and were commonly reflective of information already incorporated 
into stock prices. !d. ("According to a study of 207 corporate bond rating 
changes from 1950 to 1972, credit rating changes generated information of 
little or no value. The changes merely reflected information already 
incorporated into stock market prices-and indeed lagged that information 
by as much as eighteen months."). 
14 SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 149-73 (describing a number of high profile 
rating debacles in a chapter entitled "Blown Calls"). As Senator Lieberman, 
Chair of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, observed: 
[T]he credit rating agencies were dismally lax in their 
coverage of Enron. They didn't ask probing questions and 
generally accepted at face value whatever Enron officials 
chose to tell them. And while they claim to rely primarily 
on public filings with the SEC, analysts from Standard & 
Poor's not only did not read Enron's proxy statement, 
they didn't even know what information they might 
contain. 
Press Release, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, Financial Oversight of Enron: The SEC and Private-Sector 
Watchdogs (Oct. 8, 2002). 
15 See JACOBS. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC 
INSECURITY AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 3-5 (2008). 
16 !d. (arguing that Americans are bearing increasingly greater economic 
risks). 
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Particularly in light of the credit market's information asymmetries, 
the public's confidence in CRAs has been called into question. 17 
This article examines the role of credit rating agencies in the 
evolving financial markets. The movement away from relationship­
based lending sited on trust to the less personal and more distensive 
capital markets made an objective assessment of creditworthiness 
essential to structure legitimate financial transactions, as well as to 
evaluate the credibility of investor decision-making. As CRAs have 
devoted a greater share of their resources to develop methods of 
rating these progressively more exotic securities, their dedicated 
influence over the organization of and participation in the capital 
markets has grown exponentially, thus making the issue of the 
accuracy of credit ratings and the accountability of CRAs ever-more 
critical. 18 
IL The Emergence ofthe Securitization Market 
Driven by bankers, speculators, traders, lawyers, 
accountants, investors, CRAs and other participants, the financial 
markets have experienced a massive transformation in virtually every 
respect over the past decade and a half. 19 Advanced information 
17 Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke observed that 
since August, mortgage lenders, commercial and 
investment banks, and structured investment vehicles have 
experienced great difficulty in rolling over commercial 
paper backed by subprime and other mortgages. More 
broadly, a loss of confidence in credit ratings led to a 
sharp contraction in the asset-backed commercial paper 
market as short-term investors withdrew their funds .... 
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Liquidity Provision by the 
Federal Reserve, Address at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Financial 
Markets Conference (May 13, 2008) (transcript available at 
http://www .federalreserve.gov /newsevents/speech/bernanke20080513 .htm). 
18 U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF 
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 
5 (Jan. 2003) (" [T]he importance of [credit rating agency] opinions to 
investors and other market participants, and the influence of these opinions 
on the securities markets, have increased significantly ...."). 
19 DANIEL J. BOORSTTN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 
55-56,204-05,210-11,419 (1973) (chronicling the emergence in the mid­
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systems20 have led to the emergence of the securitization market in 
which public and private investors are able to purchase wide arrays 
of innovative investment products.21 These investment products 
include complex securitized assets and derivatives backed by 
mortgage loans,22 credit cards, and other consumer-credit 
receivables. 23 
nineteenth century of CRAs in response to wholesalers' need for reliable 
credit rating information, which emerge from practices such as the use of 
lawyers in the west to investigate local businesses for credit worthiness, the 
ever expanding complexity of accounting in the industrial age, the 
development of Certified Public Accountants in response to new forms 
taxation, and the development of new forms of incorporation and 
investment trusts). 
20 See Julie L. Williams & James F.E. Gillespie, Jr., The Impact of 
Technology on Banking: The Effect and Implications of "Deconstruction" 
of Banking Functions, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 135, 136-40 (2001) 
(describing the role of technology in the bank deconstruction phase of the 
1990s). 
21 Securitization, or structured finance, is a process whereby an entity pools 
together its interests in identifiable cash flows and then sells them to 
investors in the form of securities. These cash flows can be sold with or 
without collateral support. The securitizing entity initially sells its cash 
flows to a Special Purpose Corporation, commonly referred to as an SPC, 
which then in turn, transforms these cash flows into securities. The 
securities, backed by the cash flows (asset-backed securities or ABS, or 
mortgage-backed securities or MBS) are then sold to private or public 
investors. A firm can originate a securitization transaction only if it has 
earnings in the form of cash flow from long- or medium- term obligations 
owed to it by what are known as account debtors. See generally 
SECURTTTZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed. 1997 
& Supp. 2008) (explaining the structure of securitization transactions); 
JAMES A. ROSENTHAL & JUAN M. OCAMPO, SECURITIZATION OF CREDIT: 
INSIDE THE NEW TECHNOLOGY OF FINANCE 3 (1988) (describing 
securitization as a method of finance). 
22 The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") states that 
[MBSs] are debt obligations that represent claims to the 
cash flows from pools of mortgage loans, most commonly 
on residential property. Mortgage loans are purchased 
from banks, mortgage companies, and other originators 
and then assembled into pools by a governmental, quasi­
governmental, or private entity. The entity then issues 
securities that represent claims on the principal and 
646 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 28 
The securitization market was born in 1970 with the first 
mortgage-backed security issuance. 24 Non-real-estate public-asset­
backed security issuances took off in the mid 1980s, when the 
interest payments made by borrowers on the loans in the 
pool, a process known as securitization. 
U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Mortgage-Backed Securities, http://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
23 SYLVAIN RAYNES & ANN RUTLEDGE, THE ANALYSTS OF STRUCTURED 
SECURITIES: PRECISE RISK MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL ALLOCATION vii 
(2003) (describing structured securities, which include asset-backed 
securities, as "debt securities backed by the pooled receivables of existing 
loans, leases, trade fmancings, bonds, or other fmancial assets whose credit 
risk generally has been de linked from the credit of the originator or seller by 
sale, swap or assignment."); see also Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: 
The Unsecured Creditors' Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REv. 595, 660 (1998) 
[hereinafter Lupica, Asset Securitization]; Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of 
the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory Institutionalization ofSecuritization, 
33 CoNN. L. REV. 199, 208-230, 236-240 (2000). In January 1989, the non­

seasonally adjusted outstanding pool of securitized assets from revolving 

and non-revolving consumer loans was $802,841,790,000. In April 2006, 

that same pool of securitized assets was valued at $2,292,839,490,000. 

Federal Reserve Statistical Release G-19, Consumer Credit Historical Data, 

Mar. 6, 2009, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/hist/cc_hist_mt. 

html. 

24 The following excerpt illustrates the history: 

[t]he first MBS was brought to market by Ginnie Mae in 
1970. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s the major 
type of MBS security was the pass-through security ... A 
major innovation for the MBS market occurred in 1983 
when Freddie Mac issued the first Collateralized 
Mortgage Obligations (CMOs). These new instruments 
appealed to investors with special maturity and cash-flow 
requirements. However, the first CMO issues faced 
complex tax, accounting and regulatory obstacles. Much 
of those legal issues were resolved with the passing of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, which included the Real Estate 
Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) tax vehicle. After 
1986 the issuance of CMOs grew enormously. 
IVO KOLEV, FINANCIAL POLICY FORUM DERIVATIVES STUDY CENTER, 
PRIMER: MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (2004), http://www.financial 
policy .org/fpfprirnermbs.htm. 
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increasing use of computers in the financial services sector enabled 
the funds tracking and analysis that enabled the pooling and 
redistributions of income-generating loans. 25 Since the early days of 
these markets, the volume of issuances has grown exponentially. 26 In 
2006, the approximate combined market for ABSs and CDOs was 
between $10.7 and $12.7 trillion. 27 At its market peak, securitization 
was hailed as "one of the most significant financial innovations in the 
global capital markets during the past 15 years."28 Commentators 
once believed that securitization would forever continue to "evolve 
25 Lowell L. Bryan, Structured Securitized Credit: A Superior Technology 
for Lending, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 1988, at 10-11 (describing Franklin 
Savings' $100 million securitization of government loans). This issuance 
was followed by a deal originated by General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation in 1986.ld. 

26 See Federal Reserve Statistical Release G-19, supra note 23. 

27 Matt Miller, Chain of Fools, THE DEAL, Oct. 3, 2008, 

http://www.thedeal.com/newsweekly/features/chain-of-fools.php. 

28 Adam Reinebach, As Franchise Loan Industry Expands, Securitization 

Deals are Following, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., May 1 I, 1998, at 13 
(forecasting that the franchise asset class will significantly expand in the 
next years); Adam Reinebach, The Outlook for ABS is So Rosy That It's 
Scary, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., June I, 1998, at 26 (describing the 
securitization of intellectual property futures, utility losses, and reinsurance 
risk while stating that the rapid growth of securitization is a result of a 
combination of low and stable interest rates and good economic conditions); 
Matthew Schifrin & Howard Rudnitsky, Rx for Receivables, FORBES, May 
6, 1996, at 52 (describing the securitization of pharmaceutical receivables); 
Suzanne Wooley & Stan Crock, You Can Securitize Virtually Everything, 
Bus. WK., Jul. 20, I 992, at 78 ("Few financial innovations have been more 
of a bonanza to Wall Street than asset-backed securities."); Michael 
Gregory, SG Cowen Brings First Rights Deal, STRUCTURED FINANCE 
NEWS, Mar. 13, 2000, http:/ /www.structuredfinancenews.com/issues/ 
2000_1 1/161855-l.html?type=printer_friendly (describing the securitization 
of a sports stadium naming rights contract); Standard & Poor's: US. Asset­
Backed Securities Market Will Continue Expansion, PRNEWSWIRE, Feb. 10, 
2000 (statement of Dr. Joseph Hu, head of the Standard & Poor's Structured 
Finance research team, that asset securitization is one of the greatest 
innovations in the last decade and a halt); see also Kim Clark, On the 
Frontier of Creative Finance, FORTUNE, Apr. 28, 1997, at 50 (describing 
trends in securitization); Ron J. Feldman, Senior Vice President, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Will the Securitization Revolution Spread? 
(Sept. 1995), http://www.minneapolisfed .org/research/pub _ display.cfm 
?id=3684 (describing securitization as a "profound change in banking"). 
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and expand."29 Standard & Poor's ("S&P") observed during the 
1990s that securitization's continued attractiveness to investors was 
due to the high quality and stability of the issued assets? 0 
To be sure, securitization has offered myriad benefits to 
many financial market participants.31 Securitized and derivative 
financial products have allowed both financiers and investors to 
hedge market and currency risk while simultaneously meeting the 
goals of financial institutions to borrow cheaply, transfer and 
diversify risk, access new sources of capital, and take advantage of 
economies of scale.32 It has also resulted in unprecedented profits 
booked by participants in the financial markets33-including rating 
. 34
agencies. 
29 Stephen L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy ofAsset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. 

Bus. & FIN. 133, 134-141 (1994) (describing the process and uses of 

securitization and referring to securitization as "alchemy"); Greenspan, 

supra note 6; Debra Sparks, Bad Loans Made Good, Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 

1998, at 12, available at http://www.businessweek.com/1998/43/b3601155; 

Standard & Poor's, supra note 28 ("'Asset securitization is one of the most 

significant financial innovations in the global capital markets during the past 

15 years,' says the report's author, Dr. Joseph Hu .... 'Not only will the 

issuance volume expand, but the variety of underlying assets and innovative 

structures will also grow."'). 

30 Shane Kite, Insiders' Predictions Point to Maturing Market, Oct. 18, 

1999, http://www .structuredfmancenews.com/issues/1999 _ 421161611-1. 

html; Standard & Poor's: US. Asset-Backed Securities Market Will 

Continue Expansion, supra note 28; Akil Salim Roper, ABS Market 

Expected to Grow in 1999, 17 PRIVATE PLACEMENT LETTER 2, 2 ( 1999). 

31 See, e.g., Schwarcz supra note 29, at 136, 146-54 (describing the benefits 

securitization offers issuers, including providing a source of off-balance 

sheet funding and reducing net financing costs). 

32 Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 23, at 605; see also RAYNES & 

RUTLEDGE, supra note 23, at vii. 

33 Banking profitability began reaching record highs at the turn of the 

millennium. Condition and Performance of Commercial Banks, U.S. 

OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY: QUARTERLY J., Dec. 

1999, at 1, available at http:/ /fmdarticles.com/p/articles/mi_ qu3 887 I 

is_l99912/ai_n8863440. In the three months ending September 30, 1999, 

banks reported $19.4 billion in net income, a record level. !d. Both return on 

assets and return on equity in the banking industry as a whole had also 

reached record levels. !d. 

34 See, e.g., Moody's Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 25 (Mar. 2, 

2009) (depicting that Moody's Corp. earnings were higher than that of its 

peer groups as well as the S&P 500 composite index). 
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While minimizing risk and making money is what the 
finance industry does (rewards are meted out based on who does this 
best), with escalating profits comes the risk of complacency.35 
Bankers and CRAs fell into this complacency by failing to recognize 
and address some of securitization's fault lines and failings in the 
market's operation.36 A central failing of the market is directly tied to 
the "too-clever-by-half'37 structure of many of these complex 
transactions: few truly understood these transactions, the nature of 
the investments being sold, and how to evaluate the risk associated 
with the underlying assets.38 
We now know, with the benefit of hindsight, that the full 
measure of risk39 was not captured or reflected in the ratings in this 
35 With the creation of a robust secondary market for loans, in turn resulting 
in enormous balance-sheet flexibility, securitization has accounted for 20 to 
30 percent of investment banks' profits. Fear and Loathing, supra note 6, at 
77. 

36 What Went Wrong, ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 2008, http://www.economist. 

com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story _id=1 0881318. 

37 As The Economist observed, 

[t]here is a growing consensus that loose credit and too­
clever-by-half financial wizardry sowed the seeds of 
America's still-deepening economic malaise. One practice 
in particular has been singled out for censure-the 
bundling of loans into assets that could be sold on to 
investors. The charge is that by breaking the link between 
those who vet borrowers and those who bear the cost 
when they default, securitisation led to the lax lending that 
both fuelled and felled America's housing market. 
Chain of Fools, ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 2008, http://www.economist.com/ 
finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10641119. 
38 The SEC released findings in the summer of 2008, after an "extensive I 0­
month examinations of three major credit rating agencies," indicating 
"significant weaknesses in ratings practices and the need for remedial action 
by the firms to provide meaningful ratings and the necessary levels of 
disclosure to investors." Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC 
Examinations Find Shortcomings in Credit Rating Agencies' Practices and 
Disclosures to Investors (July 8, 2008), available at http://www.sec. 
gov/news/press/2008/ 2008-135.htm. 
39 The central risks facing investors purchasing MBSs and ABSs are the 
credit quality of the underlying receivables, the value of the underlying 
collateral (if collateralized), the issuers' operational risks, uncertainty in 
650 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW Vol. 28 
market.40 Appreciating and accurately valuing the assets supporting 
ABSs and MBSs is fundamental to any risk assessment. 41 In the 
governing law, and the bankruptcy of the issuer. The S&P websites states 
that the Servicer Evaluation review process includes "Management and 
Organization; Internal Controls; Historical Portfolio Performance; Cash 
Management; Organizational Efficiency; [and] Loan Asset/Administration." 
Standard & Poor's, Servicer Evaluations, http://www2.standardandpoors. 
com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.topic/ratings _sf_ se/2, I ,9,6,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0, 
O,O.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2009). S&P conducts analysis with respect to 
ABS services with "a dedicated team of analysts assess[ing] a wide range of 
a servicer's business practices .... through on-site meetings and analyses of 
company materials and data, summarizing in a report its findings and 
recommendations."). 
40 If a debtor in bankruptcy has securitized a portion of its assets, its trustee 
will be concerned with any and all vulnerabilities presented by the 
transaction's structure, as well as the extent to which its contractual 
agreements are enforceable under the law. See 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2000). If 
even one element of the transaction is vulnerable to challenge, the ABS 
investors' return on its investment will be compromised. Accordingly, the 
degree of risk to which ABS investors are subject is in large part a factor of 
the successful structuring of the bankruptcy-remote transaction. A 
bankruptcy-remote transaction structure isolates the special purpose entity 
("SPE") from the effects of the securitizing debtor's bankruptcy. This is 
accomplished by (i) ensuring that the asset transfer meets the judicial test of 
a "true sale;" (ii) providing for the SPE's separateness, so that a court will 
not substantively consolidate the SPE and the originator; and (iii) 
compliance with relevant legal formalities, such a perfection of security 
interests, and due organization of each entity under applicable law. A 
bankruptcy-remote transaction structure is one that also protects SPE 
investors from the SPE's potential bankruptcy. To minimize the chance of 
an SPE's insolvency, transaction sponsors commonly include a variety of 
pre-petition bankruptcy waivers, or "hindrance mechanisms" in an SPE's 
organizational documents. Examples of these hindrance mechanisms 
include (i) provisions in the SPE' s organizing documents, limiting its 
purpose and activities; (ii) limitations on the SPE's indebtedness; (iii) 
guarantees that become effective upon the occurrence of an entity's 
bankruptcy; (iv) provisions in charter documents that require unanimous 
consent of all managers, in order to file for bankruptcy; (v) an agreement by 
the debtor that a bankruptcy filing would be in "bad faith"; (vi) an 
agreement by the debtor to waive the terms of the automatic stay, pre­
petition; and (vii) an agreement by the debtor to seek court abstention, upon 
a filing for bankruptcy. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its 
Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1564-80; Gary Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, 
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absence of a precise understanding and valuation of securitized 
assets, the exercise in arbitrage fails, and the credit rating becomes 
based upon a misunderstanding that in turn determines the faulty 
MBS, ABS, or CDO pricing.42 This has the potential to lead to 
further failings in the fundamental structuring of transactions, with, 
for example, senior tranches' fallibility far greater than their rating 
(and pricing) suggests.43 
Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization 9-10, 35-36 (Nat'l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11190, 2005). 
S&P has also stated that bankruptcy-remote transaction structuring 
is always a large factor in overall SPE structure: "At the heart of every 
structured finance transaction is a vehicle designed to protect investors in 
the event of a bankruptcy. The credibility of these bankruptcy-remote 
vehicles and the criteria by which their levels of risk are measured stand as 
the foundation oftoday's structured finance market." 
Standard & Poor's-Ratings, Structured Finance, http://www2. 
standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page. family /ratings _sf/2, 1 ,9 ,0,0,0 
,O,O,O,O,O,O,O,O,O,O.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2009). 
41 See generally Thomas J. Gordon, Securitization of Executory Future 
Flows as Bankruptcy-Remote True Sales, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1318 
(2000) (providing background information on the process of securitization); 
Lupica, Asset Securitization, supra note 23, at 595 (describing the risks 
associated with securitization); RAYNES & RUTLEDGE, supra note 23; 
Schwarcz, supra note 29, at 134-41 (detailing the process and benefits of 
asset securitization). 
42 The press release describing the SEC report on rating agency performance 
noted that 
[t]he SEC staff's examinations found that rating agencies 
struggled significantly with the increase in the number 
and complexity of subprime residential mortgage-backed 
securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt obligations 
(CDO) deals since 2002. The examinations uncovered that 
none of the rating agencies examined had specific written 
comprehensive procedures for rating RMBSs and CDOs. 
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, supra note 38; see also U.S. SEC. & 

EXCH. COMM'N, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE 

COMMISSION STAFF'S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 

36-37 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/cra 

examination070808.pdf. 

43 As the SEC states in its report, 
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Whether the financial modeling tools developed to quantity 
the risk of investing in these securitized and derivative products were 
44 d 45 46. 1 fl h . . d h h hmcomp ete, awe , or ot erw1se ma equate, or w et er t e 
rating agencies, blinded by extraordinary profits47 and conflicts of 
interest,48 ignored the risks revealed by these models is not yet clear. 
What has become clear, as the CRAs have tried to dust themselves 
[a] key step in the process of creating and ultimately 
selling a subprime RMBS and COO is the issuance of a 
credit rating for each of the tranches issued by the trust 
(with the exception of the most junior "equity" tranche). 
The credit rating for each rated tranche indicates the credit 
rating agency's view as to the creditworthiness of the debt 
instrument in terms of the likelihood that the issuer would 
default on its obligations to make interest and principle 
payments on the debt instrument. 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 42, at 7. 
44 It is clear that rating agencies gave high ratings to subprime-mortgage 
securities that subsequently sank in value, and then reacted slowly as 
defaults rose. The Role ofCredit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance 
Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises ofthe H. Comm. on Financial Services, 
110th Cong. 49-50 (2007) (examining the extent to which credit rating 
agencies contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis). 
45 See note 42 and accompanying text. 
46 CRAs' ratings either did not accurately reflect such risks at the time of 
issue, or lagged behind once circumstances changed. Rating the Raters: 
Enron and the Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Governmental Affairs, I 07th Cong. 44 (2002) (statement of Jonathan R. 
Macey, Professor of Law) (examining the failure of rating agencies in 
predicting Enron's collapse). 
47 Anatomy of a Deal, Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 1998, at 128-29, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/1998/43/b360 I 156.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 
2009) (stating that "[s]ecuritization is a money machine" for mortgage 
brokers, finance companies, investment bankers and institutional investors). 
In the past years, for example, Moody's earnings rose over 375%, largely as 
a result of the proliferation of structured fmance deals. Partnoy, supra note 
13, at 65-67. Until very recently, structured finance transactions accounted 
for 43 percent of Moody's revenues. !d. at 60. 
48 Aaron Lucchetti, Rating Game: As Housing Boomed, Moody's Opened 
Up, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1 I, 2001, at A I (detailing the changes in institutional 
culture at Moody's that may have led to conflicts of interest, as Moody's 
officials became more socially connected to investment bankers by making 
themselves more accessible and accepting social invitations). 
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off and repair both their balance sheets and their reputations, is that 
there are specific points of systemic failure in their rating 
methodology, analysis, organization, and processes. 49 
IlL The Influence ofCredit Ratings 
Credit Rating Agencies are private organizations performing 
a quasi-public function. 50 Since the early twentieth century, investors 
49 The following is S&P's description of its decision to review its method of 
rating collateralized debt obligations: 
Standard & Poor's Ratings Services announced in 
a recent article that it is conducting a comprehensive 
review of all assumptions and methodologies it uses to 
assign ratings to corporate synthetic collateralized debt 
obligation (COO) transactions ....As a first step in the 
review, Standard & Poor's examined the global corporate 
synthetic COOs it rates to identify any systemic 
concentration risks in this sector. The article notes that 
this sector as a whole generally appears to have 
considerable exposure to 100 global corporate issuers. 
While the high rate of name overlap among these 
portfolios does not make any individual portfolio riskier 
than another, the sector could see an increase in 
downgrades if these 100 names experience negative rating 
migration. 
"In our analysis, we identified a number of key 
risks we saw for corporate synthetic COOs. These 
include: collateral performance, such as default/credit 
events, rating transition, sector correlation, and recovery 
rates; counterparty jump to default risk; and widening 
CDS spreads," credit analyst Belinda Ghetti said. 
"As a result of our review, we will likely look for 
more credit enhancement for all rating categories, and 
adjust our ratings on outstanding corporate synthetic 
CDOs.... In the interim, Standard & Poor's is committed 
to promoting transparency in the corporate synthetic COO 
market. ..." Ms. Ghetti stated. 
Press Release, Standard & Poor's, Advance Notice of Criteria Change for 

Corporate Synthetic COO's Published (Jan. 12, 2009). 

50 Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 916, 

934 (1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The 
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and regulators have looked to CRAs to evaluate the creditworthiness 
of an obligor or a securities issuer. While their ostensible function is 
to address information asymmetries inherent in many public debt 
finance transactions, in practice, their judgments about issuers and 
issuances goes beyond a mere evaluation of credit. The internal 
policies of CRAs in developing ratings criteria have the effect of 
"adjust[ing] the 'ground rules' inside international capital markets, 
thereby shaping the internal organization and behavior of institutions 
seeking funds." 51 The criteria developed and operationalized by 
ratings agencies influence the level of activity of the finance markets, 
the allocation of capital, as well as the cost of credit. 5 2 Until recently, 
financial markets generally considered the pronouncements of CRAs 
to be both trustworthy and authoritative. 
Very few rating agencies, however, hold this authority. Iftoo 
much power and influence is held by too few institutions and if these 
few institutions have exclusive access to too much information about 
securities and issuers, the potential for competition is thwarted, and 
behavior corrupted. Currently, only three CRAs qualify as Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations ("NRSRO"): Moody's, 
S&P, and Fitch. Qualification as an NRSRO requires a certain 
amount of ratings volume, a substantial track record and recognition 
in the market. 5 3 An agency's reputation is developed over many years 
by rating a multitude of types of issuers and issuances. Thus, the 
NRSRO designation and the structure and function of the market act 
as a barrier to entry. 54 The influence of the few NRSROs goes even 
Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REv. 301, 302 
(2004); Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735, 742 (2004). 
51 SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 15. 
52 Stephane Rousseau, Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating 
Agencies: The Case for a Disclosure-Based Approach, in CREDIT RATING 
AGENCIES: NEED FOR REFORM TN CANADA?, at 14 (Capital Markets Institute 
Policy Series, Aug. 2005) ("Through their activities, [CRAs] influence the 
conditions under which issuers will have access to debt markets, the 
conditions of their relationships with lenders, and the structure of their 
transactions."). 
53 Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of2006, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7 (2008). 
54 The imperfectly competitive market is further exacerbated by the essential 
nature of a rating agency's reputational capital. Rating the Rating Agencies: 
The State of Transparency and Competition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises of 
the H. Comm. on Financial Services, I 08th Cong. (2003) (statement of 
Annette L. Nazareth, Director, Division of Market Regulations, SEC). It has 
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further, however: a number of regulatory schemes have integrated 
private credit assessments into their rubric. For example, the 
streamlined purchase of securities by institutional investors is 
conditioned upon an NRSRO rating of a certain level. 55 These so­
called regulatory licenses56 function in lieu of the public regulation of 
security issuances to a certain strata of investors and serve to amplify 
CRA opinions' utility in the public markets. 
As complex securitization and multi-level derivative 
transactions have become ever-more commonplace, information 
asymmetries between issuers and investors have grown larger. This 
has made investor reliance on the opinions of CRAs increasingly 
cost-effective and efficient. It has also exaggerated CRAs' market 
influence as well as the consequences of inaccurate pronouncements. 
The huge sway CRAs have over activity in the financial markets has 
made their present-day failures exceedingly conspicuous, thus 
leading to calls for greater accountability. As the public seeks to 
identify the villain in the current financial drama, credit rating 
agencies got caught up in the chase and have recently been subject to 
pervasive and widespread censure. 
IV. Rating Agencies' Points ofSystemic Failure 
As the structured finance markets have increasingly relied 
upon CRAs to correct extreme information asymmetries, their power 
and influence has grown. The tremendous authority wielded by 
CRAs in the market for securitized assets has revealed numerous 
points of potential systemic failure inherent in CRAs' rating system. 
This potential has been realized on a grand scale as a result of the 
recent unprecedented stresses in the financial markets. In response, 
been further alleged that "the largest rating agencies have abused their 
dominant position by engaging in certain aggressive competitive practices." 
Id These practices have included providing unsolicited ratings, thereby 
forcing issuers to pay for ratings they did not request. ld 
55 Partnoy, supra note 13, at 66 (arguing that that because of the 
"regulations that depend exclusively on credit ratings issued by [NRSROs]," 
economic rents are generated that persist, even in the face of inaccurate 
ratings, when they would otherwise suffer from a decline in reputational 
capital). 
56 See Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets: The Role of Credit Rating 
Agencies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs, II Oth Cong. 2 (Apr. 22, 2008) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Professor ofLaw) [hereinafter Statement of Professor Coffee]. 
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scholars,57 the press, lawmakers,58 and market participants have 
called for reform: CRAs must not only be made accountable for their 
ratings; they must also, going forward, be far more reliable. 
A. 	 Independent Verification of Information and 
Greater Transparency 
Rating agencies have been criticized for not conducting 
independent diligence in connection with their structured securities 
rating analysis. 59 Exclusive reliance upon issuers and underwriters as 
information sources leaves open the potential for the ratings 
information inputs to be either biased or incomplete. 60 There is little 
short-term incentive for issuers to completely disclose information 
about all aspects of the underlying assets because selectively 
57 See generally Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert ofFinancial Markets?: 
Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 
648-654 (1999); Partnoy, supra note 13, at 63-64, 72-73, 86-92 (criticizing 
the quality and accuracy ofinfonnation provided by credit rating agencies). 
58 See Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 
Securities Act Release No. 8570, Exchange Act Release No. 51,572, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,834, 70 Fed. Reg. 21,306 
(proposed Apr. 25, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); COMMITTEE 
OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES REGULATORS, CESR's TECHNICAL ADVICE TO 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON POSSIBLE MEASURES CONCERNING CREDIT 
RATING AGENCIES ~~ 154-192 (2004); Press Release, International 
Organization of Securities Commissions, IOSCO Releases Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies (Dec. 2004). 
59 Statement of Professor Coffee, supra note 56, at 9 ("[I]n the case of 
structured fmance products . . . rating agencies do request and receive 
information, but they do not audit, verity or even sample it. ... Put simply, 
this is the equivalent of an auditor accepting an issuer's statements about its 
revenues, costs, inventories and contingent liabilities at face value. Absent 
some efforts at verification, it is doubtful that the ratings on structured 
fmance will ever again be credible to much of the debt market."). 
60 There is a special exemption in Regulation Fair Disclosure ("Regulation 
FD") for credit rating agencies: The issuer can selectively give information 
to some rating agencies, and not others. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 243, 249 (2008) 
("The third exclusion from coverage in Rule 1 OO(b)(2) is for disclosures to 
an entity whose primary business is the issuance of credit ratings, provided 
the information is disclosed solely for the purpose of developing a credit 
rating and the entity's ratings are publicly available."). 
2009 CREDIT RATING AGENCIES & STRUCTURED SECURITIES 657 
choosing which information to provide may well increase an issuer's 
credit rating. 61 
Moreover, rating agencies have been criticized for the lack of 
transparency with respect to the information utilized in arriving at a 
rating,62 as well as regarding their internal methodologies, processes, 
and fee structure. 63 The lack of disclosure of fee structures and a lack 
of transparency of ratings process in general has served to undermine 
public confidence in their pronouncements.64 
B. 	 The Accuracy and Limitations of Quantitative 
Models 
As the market for asset-backed securities and derivative 
products exploded, rating agencies endeavored to keep pace with the 
increasing volume of issuances. In their efforts to identify and 
capture risk, they developed new quantitative methods of rating the 
increasingly exotic security issuances. These methods included the 
design of complex models to ostensibly analyze, evaluate, and 
determine the quality of the underlying assets' cash flows and thus 
the securities' risk. 65 
61 Stephane Rousseau, Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating 
Agencies: The Case for a Disclosure-Based Approach 7, 33-34 (2005), 
http://www.droitdesaffaires.org/pdf/enhancing.pdf. 
62 Cf MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE, INSIDE MOODY'S: CREDIT POLICY 2-11 
(Apr. 2008), http://v2.moodys.com/moodys/cust/content/content.ashx? 
source=StaticContent/Free%20Pages/Credit%20Policy/CreditPolicy.pdf 
(citing the increasing lack of confidence in credit ratings and explaining 
how Moody's methods and models are designed to encourage transparency). 
63 Rousseau, supra note 61, at 46-47. 
64 See SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS ASSOC., RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION CREDIT 
RATING AGENCY TASK FORCE 2-9 (2008), http://www.sifma.org/capital 
_markets/docs/SIFMA-CRA-Recommendations.pdf (recommending that 
CRAs disclose their rating methodology, the information they rely upon in 
formulating their ratings, their surveillance procedures, and comparable 
CRA performance so as to increase market confidence in their credit 
ratings). 
65 According to reports made in the early 1990s, this analysis involved a 
review of the receivable pool's historic record in order to discard those 
receivables perceived to be high risk. Jonathan E. Keighley, Risks in 
Securitisation Transactions, in THE GLOBAL ASSET BACKED SECURITIES 
MARKET: STRUCTURING, MANAGING AND ALLOCATING RISK 100-01 
(Charles Stone et al. eds., 1993) (explaining steps to restructuring the 
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A great deal of criticism has been leveled at the quantitative 
models CRAs used to assess risk.66 The most pointed criticism is that 
these models too often "got it wrong." This was either because too 
much confidence was placed on numerical, objective analysis, or not 
enough contextual attention was paid to these numerics.67 
originator's asset pool). Receivables with a history of late payment, an 
origination from specific, less desirable industries or depressed geographical 
regions, or from classes of less financially dependable obligors were 
eliminated from the pool or required to be credit-enhanced. !d. Specific loss 
probability parameters were set, and those receivables not falling within 
these parameters, or not sufficiently credit enhanced, were eliminated from 
the pool. !d. Before long, scientists and mathematicians developed statistical 
tools for measuring and quantifying risk. The most commonly used model, 
known as VaR (Value at Risk) measured "the boundaries of risk in a 
portfolio over short durations, assuming a "normal market." The VaR 
measurement appealed to investors because "it expresses risk as a single 
number, a dollar figure, no less .... For instance, if you have $50 million of 
weekly VaR, that means that over the course of the next week, there is a 99 
percent chance that your portfolio won't lose more than $50 million." Joe 
Nocera, Risk Mismanagement: Were the Measures Used to Evaluate Wall 
Street Trades Flawed? Or was the Mistake Ignoring Them?, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., JAN. 4, 2009, at 24, 26. 
66 See, e.g., Statement of Professor Coffee, supra note 56, at 4 ("In 
hindsight, it is now evident that the [quantitative] models used by the ratings 
agencies to estimate the risk of loss on structured fmance products 
(especially COOs) were flawed and inaccurate."); Nocera, supra note 65, at 
26 ("Given the calamity that has since occurred, there has been a great deal 
of talk, even in quant circles, that this widespread institutional reliance on 
VaR was a terrible mistake."). 
67 Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, stated in 2008 
that 
[t]he ... surge in global demand for U.S. subprime 
securities by banks, hedge, and pension funds supported 
by unrealistically positive rating designations by credit 
agencies was, in my judgment, the core of the problem. 
Demand became so aggressive that too many securitizers 
and lenders believed they were able to create and sell 
mortgage backed securities so quickly that they never put 
their shareholders' capital at risk and hence did not have 
the incentive to evaluate the credit quality of what they 
were selling. Pressures on lenders to supply more "paper" 
collapsed subprime underwriting standards from 2005 
forward. Uncritical acceptance of credit ratings by 
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Moreover, the mathematical models commonly used reflected 
risk based upon short-term, rather than long-term historical data. As 
Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, stated in 
his "mea culpa" testimony before a Congressional Oversight 
Committee: 
The whole intellectual edifice [underpinning the 
advances in derivatives markets] ... collapsed in the 
summer of last year because the data inputted into 
the risk management models generally covered only 
the past two decades, a period of euphoria. Had 
instead the models been fitted more appropriately to 
historic periods of stress, capital requirements would 
have been much higher and the financial world 
would be in far better shape today .... 68 
Further, CRAs' quantitative models failed or were slow to 
consider the impact of changed underwriting practices on the part of 
front line lenders. Little, if any, scrutiny was made of the securitized 
receivables and supporting collateral; as such, high loan to value 
ratio loans ("HLTV loans": between 90% and 125%) and no­
documentation loans (commonly known as "liar loans") were often 
not reflected in the models' risk rating.69 With no independent 
verification conducted by rating agencies about the actual 
purchasers of these toxic assets has led to huge losses. It 
was the failure to properly price such risky assets that 
precipitated the crisis. In recent decades, a vast risk 
management and pricing system has evolved, combining 
the best insights of mathematicians and finance experts 
supported by major advances in computer and 
communications technology. A Nobel Prize was awarded 
for the discovery of the pricing model that underpins 
much of the advance in derivates markets. This modern 
risk management paradigm held sway for decades. 
The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before 
the Comm. of Government Oversight and Reform, llOth Cong. 3 (2008) 
(testimony of Dr. Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve). 
68 !d. at 3-4. 
69 See Statement of Professor Coffee, supra note 56, at 7. 
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underwriting standards employed, the quantitative analysis of risk 
failed to factor in this data. 70 
In addition, the quantitative risks assessment models failed to 
take into account what is known as "default dependence" or "default 
contagion." 71 A default is "dependent" or "contagious" when 
conditions are such that a default by one borrower increases the 
default probability of other borrowers. 72 For example, the stress 
experienced by the subprime mortgage market rapidly spread to other 
financial sectors.73 As the current economic environment is 
demonstrating, risk can be both interconnected and contagious?4 
Finally, the limitations inherent in any quantitative modeling 
tool were not fully recognized by the credit analysts ultimately 
responsible for rating the MBSs, ABSs and derivatives. 75 Over­
70 See id. at 9. 
71 I d. at 4. 
72 See id. 
73 Moody's stated that 
[ c ]red it problems initially localized in subprime US 
mortgages quickly spread to other complex financial 
vehicles with subprime exposure and triggered a broad 
repricing of risk. This affected not only a variety of 
fmancial vehicles holding subprime paper . . . but also 
bled into other asset classes, such as Alt-A mortgages, 
commercial mortgages, leveraged loans, covered bonds, 
the corporate sector more generally, and, prospectively, 
credit card securitizations. 
MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE, supra note 62, at 7. 

74 See id. at 7-8. 

75 The following observation was attributed to Nassim Nicholas Taleb, 

Distinguished Professor of Risk Engineering at New York University: 

Wall street risk models, no matter how mathematically 
sophisticated, are bogus; ... the essential reason for this is 
that the greatest risks are never the ones you can see and 
measure, but the ones you can't see and therefore can 
never measure. The ones that seem so far outside the 
boundary of normal probability that you can't imagine 
they could happen in your lifetime-even though, of 
course, they do happen, more often than you care to 
realize. Devastating hurricanes happen. Earthquakes 
happen. And once in a great while, huge fmancial 
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reliance on "math" to the exclusion of consideration of subjective 
factors impacting credit quality such as the issuer's management 
quality, competitive market position, financial policy, capital 
structure, cash flow protection, accounting practices, and the general 
economic environment led to inaccurate conclusions about levels of 
risk.76 Analysts cast aside their judgment in favor of the illusion of an 
objective risk numerical. 77 
catastrophes happen. Catastrophes that risk models 
somehow always manage to miss. 
Nocera, supra note 65, at 28 (quoting Professor Taleb). 
76 The SEC report on credit ratings agencies describing the general 
procedures CRAs use in rating issuers, additionally noted that 
[t]he primary credit considerations used in the corporate 
fmance area involve both non-fmancial and financial 
factors. Some of the non-fmancial or qualitative 
considerations include: (I) stability of markets, (2) 
diversity of markets, (3) efficiency of operation (e.g., 
distribution system and operating margins), (4) peer group 
analysis, (5) competition and market positions, and (6) 
government regulation. Financial or quantitative 
considerations include: (1) cash generation or use, (2) 
balance sheet strength, (3) debt/capitalization ratios, (4) 
interest coverage ratios, (5) operating cash flow to total 
debt ratios, and (6) fixed charge ratios. 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N., supra note 18, at 25 n.64, 25-27. 
77 Professor Coffee stated that 
[t]he real purpose and point of this proposal is to 
supplement the quantitative model of the rating agency 
with some minimal auditing (or at least sampling) that 
tests the quality of the information that the rating agency 
is relying upon. Otherwise, the oldest rule about 
quantitative models is "GIGO"-garbage in, garbage out. 
In effect, this proposal seeks to invent a new gatekeeper to 
complement the role of the rating agency because, in the 
world of structured finance, the rating agency is flying 
blind. Worse yet, because rating agencies commonly 
provide issuers and underwriters with their quantitative 
models, the latter know precisely how to "game the 
model" with only slightly misleading information to 
produce the desired result. 
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C. Conflicts of Interest 
The most oft-cited criticism of CRAs grows out of their 
practice of having issuers pay for their own ratings, thus creating a 
potentially corrupting conflict of interest.78 Such a system leaves 
open the temptation for CRAs to modulate their opinion as to the 
credit risk of securities issued by repeat issuers. 79 Because issuers of 
securities-who are rationally seeking the highest possible ratings 
for the lowest possible cost of issuance-are also the parties paying 
CRAs to issue the ratings, this arrangement has the potential to skew 
the outcome of the rating process. If the rating agency's opinion is 
based on a faulty factual foundation, or one that is arrived at in the 
context of conflicting interests, its value is lost, and the system loses 
its efficiency. In light of the fact that structured finance transactions 
have accounted for approximately 40 percent of CRA's revenues,80 
and most of the business originates from the finite investment 
banking community, this concern may be well placed. 81 
Moreover, the emergence of CRA consulting divisions 
offering risk-assessment services to issuers presents further potential 
Statement of Professor Coffee, supra note 56, at 12. 
78 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. 
ECON. 305, 308 (1976) ("We defme an agency relationship as a contract 
under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent."). 
79 U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 18, at 41 ("The practice of issuers 
paying for their own ratings creates the potential for a conflict of interest. 
Arguably, the dependence of rating agencies on revenues from the 
companies they rate could induce them to rate issuers more liberally, and 
temper their diligence in probing for negative information."). Moody's, 
S&P, and Fitch all offer customized credit risk management services and 
quantitative tools through their ancillary business divisions. 
80 See Portnoy, supra note 13, at 60, 62-69 (describing the CRAs' revenue 
structure). 
81 See generally Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC 
Examinations Find Shortcomings in Credit Rating Agencies' Practices and 
Disclosure to Investors (July 8, 2008) (available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-135.htm) ("[S]ignificant aspects 
of the rating process were not always disclosed or even documented by the 
firms, and conflicts of interest were not always managed appropriately."). 
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for conflicts of interests. 82 This is tantamount to the criticism leveled 
at accounting and law firms for offering ancillary consulting 
services: services offered by such ancillary businesses present the 
risk of compromising the validity of professional opinions. 83 If a 
CRA is both selling issuer models (analytics and data for the purpose 
of designing or improving its internal risk systems) as well as rating 
such issuer, that CRA is "highly unlikely to downgrade [that issuer's] 
risk capabilities if [that issuer] has bought one of [the CRA's] risk 
systems. "84 
V. Responses to the Public Failure 
A. Self-Regulation by NRSROs 
In response to the public pillory and the demands for greater 
accountability and transparency, each NRSRO has recently released 
what may be seen as "self-assessments" or critiques of their 
practices. These reports, likely published as part of an effort to avoid 
being subject to an onerous regulatory framework, explicitly outlines 
their points of systemic failure. 85 Framed as prescriptions for these 
82 See U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM., supra note 18, at 42. 
8' !d. at n.ll7.J 
84 Chris Marrison & Howard Radley, A Risky New Role for the Rating 
Agencies, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2003, at 19. 
85 FITCH RATINGS, FITCH RATINGS CODE OF CONDUCT 1-17 (2009), 
http://www .fitchratings.com/web _ content/credit_policy/code _of_ conduct.p 
df; MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, REPORT ON THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT 4-17 (2009), http:/ /www.moodys.com (follow "Code of 
Professional Conduct" hyperlink; then follow "Report on the Code of 
Professional Conduct-2008" hyperlink); MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE, 
INSIDE MOODY'S: CREDIT POLICY, supra note 73; STANDARD & POOR'S, 
STANDARD & POOR'S REVISES ITS APPROACH TO RATING SPECULATIVE 
GRADE CREDIT 3 (2008), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/ 
media/leadership_ actions _ratings_ 051308.pdf; STANDARD & POOR'S, 
WHAT STANDARD & POOR'S IS DOING TO INCREASE TRANSPARENCY AND 
INFORMATION TO ENHANCE U.S. RMBS RATINGS 2-6 (2008) 
http:/ /www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/subprime _ rmbs _ 050508. 
pdf; see also Press Release, Moody's Investors Service, Moody's Investors 
Service Updates its Code of Professional Conduct (Nov. 20, 2008) available 
at http:/ /www.iminers.com/render.php?eid=116842583&symboi=MCO& 
whichmodule=pressroom; Press Release, Moody's Investors Service, 
Moody's Analytics Adds Comprehensive Credit Risk Measures to its Credit 
Quotes Pricing and Valuations Service (Oct. 16, 2008) available at 
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recent failures, the reports set forth a litany of voluntary policy 
changes to the processes used to rate ABSs, MBSs, and derivative 
products.86 They each address an array of issues, including a lack of 
transparency concerning data and operations, inaccurate quantitative 
modeling, and the potential for conflicting loyalties. 87 
To illustrate,88 each NRSRO has adopted internal policies 
that require analysts to conduct a qualitative review of all loan 
originators, including an assessment of each originator's 
http://www.iminers.com/render.php?eid=115055943&symboi=MCO&whic 
hmodu le=pressroom. 
86 See PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, POLICY 
STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2008), available at 
http://www. ustreas. gov /press/releases/reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmo il_ 03 
122008.pdf ("[I]t seems clear from experience to date that the principal 
underlying causes of the turmoil in financial markets were: ... a significant 
erosion of market discipline by those involved in the securitization process, 
including ... credit rating agencies ... [and] flaws in credit rating agencies' 
assessments ...."); see also Standard & Poor's, S&P's Views of Current 
Developments in the Financial Markets, http://www.spviews.com/ (last 
visited on Apr. 5, 2009) ("Recently there has been much public discussion 
around credit rating agencies and problems in the subprime mortgage 
market. As the foremost provider of credit ratings, Standard & Poor's [] 
believes it is important that any dialogue about credit ratings be based on 
accurate information about how credit ratings agencies work and how 
ratings are used. This special section of our website has been designed to 
give readers a better understanding of the role S&P's ratings play in capital 
markets; the thoroughness, transparency and integrity of our approach; and 
the rigor of our decision-making processes."). 
87 PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 86, 
at 1-2, 8-10 (identifying the principal underlying causes of the recent turmoil 
in the financial markets, including many CRA failings). 
88 Whereas analysts rating corporate bonds rely largely on publicly available 
information (such as audited financial statements and public disclosure 
filings), prior to the effective date of Moody's criteria to be applied to rating 
MBSs, information about the receivable and underlying collateral came 
directly from the issuer or underwriter. Statement of Professor Coffee, supra 
note 56, at 9 (stating that CRAs "accept the representations and data 
provided by issuers, loan originators, and underwriters at face value and 
without undertaking any real effort to verify."). There was little or no 
independent due diligence prior to a CRA issuing a rating. !d. ("To be sure, 
ratings agencies do request and receive information, but they do not audit, 
verify or even sample it. Put simply, this is the equivalent of an auditor 
accepting an issuer's statements about its revenues, costs, inventories and 
contingent liabilities at face value."). 
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underwriting policies and procedures, property valuation procedures, 
closing and funding procedures, an evaluation of third party 
originators (meaning mortgage brokers), credit risk management 
processes, originator financial stability, quality control and audit 
procedures, legal and regulatory compliance, and a review of 
originators' technology. 89 In addition, in some cases, a third party 
must be engaged to conduct diligence on MBSs & ABSs to 
complement the role of rating agencies.90 
Moreover, given the extent to which CRAs relied upon 
quantitative models to analyze the risk associated with increasingly 
complex structured securities, each NSRO has enacted new internal 
policies to try to address the shortfalls and limitations inherent in 
their quantitative modeling. For example, a "responsible party" has 
been deputized to review the methodologies and models used in the 
rating process.91 As Moody's Credit Policy publication describes it: 
89 See, e.g., KATHRYN KELBAUGH, MOODY'S, STRUCTURED FINANCE, 
MOODY'S ENHANCED APPROACH TO ORIGINATOR ASSESSMENTS FOR U.S. 
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES 1-2 (2008) ("[O]riginator 
ability factors include (a) sales and marketing practices (b) consistency in 
underwriting loans within prescribed underwriting guidelines (c) property 
valuation management practices, policies and procedures ... closing and 
post closing policies and practices including lien perfection procedures (d) 
management of brokers and correspondents (e) credit risk management. ... 
Key attributes of originator stability include fmancial strength, management 
strength, staff quality, quality control, internal audit, technology and other 
support functions that lead to operational stability."). 
90 See, e.g., id. at 2 ("Finally, Moody's will seek to review the results of the 
third-party pre-securitization loan-level review for each transaction ... 
whether the transaction was rated by Moody's or not."). In addition, the 
issue of a lack of diligence as to the financial integrity of credit 
enhancement providers has been a key concern. As the highly publicized 
insolvency of a number of mainline providers of credit enhancement has 
demonstrated, CRAs' reliance on such insurers was misplaced. Apparently, 
the capitalization of these backstop insurers of ABSs, MBS, and CDOs was 
not fully considered by rating analysts in arriving at their risk ratings. 
91 See, e.g., Progress Update, Standard & Poor's, S&P's Steps to Further 
Manage Potential Conflicts of Interest, Strengthen the Ratings Process, and 
Better Serve the Market (Apr. I0, 2008), available at http:/ /www2. 
standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/Leadership _Actions _Full_ Update.pdf 
(describing the changes S&P has made in its governance, analytics, 
information and education and stating that "[S&P has] hired a Senior 
Director of Model Quality and [has] staffed and established the group."); 
S&P's Leadership Actions, http://www.spnewactions.com/documentation/ 
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Methodologies and models are simplifications of 
reality that focus on key credit factors and 
interaction but necessarily omit many more. They 
encourage rating consistency and transparency, but 
their output is far from definitive; the output in fact 
is used as an input itself into the final rating 
decision. Proper use of a model or scorecard 
includes a sophisticated understanding of its 
limitations. The "indicated rating" from a model is a 
starting point for rating committee discussion but 
always supplemented with some combination of 
additional information, ratios and statistics, and 
qualitative judgment, which may justifY assigning a 
rating higher or lower than the modeled output. 92 
Apparently addressing the perceived dangers inherent in over­
reliance on a numerical output, Moody's has also vowed to "focus 
intensively on how risks interconnect, on the sometimes sharp 
increase in correlations and contagion across markets, and on sources 
of systemic instability. "93 
Finally, as part of the CRAs' voluntary response to the 
expressed concern about conflicts of interest, they have explicitly 
outlined the organizational divisions between credit analysts and 
business development staffs. 94 They further claim that there will be 
index.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2009) (stating that S&P will "[e ]stablish a 
Model Oversight Committee within the Quantitative Analytics Group, 
which will be separate from and independent of the business unit, to assess 
and validate the quality of data and models used in our analytical 
processes."). 
92 MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICE, supra note 62, at 5. 
93 !d. at7-8. 
94 S&P has outlined specific initiatives, including hiring an ombudsman and 
demanding disclosure of collateral by originators in structured-finance 
securities; plans to reduce conflicts of interest through measures such as 
preventing analysts from covering issuers for more than five years. Progress 
Update, Standard & Poor's, supra note 91. "Moody's has separated its 
credit-ratings operations from its marketing and analytics and Fitch is 
reassessing the way it grades certain types of debt." Karen Freifeld, 
Moody's, S&P Reach Settlement Agreement With Cuomo, People Say, 
BLOOMBERG, June 3, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid 
=20601087&sid=azlGhfhVz3JU&refer=home; see also MOODY'S 
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no relationship between credit analysts' compensation and future 
business development.95 Moreover, the rating agencies' ancillary 
services divisions will be firewalled from the divisions conducting 
. 1 96the ratmgs ana yses. 
B. The SEC Amendments and Proposals 
The adoption and publication of these self-enforcing policies 
by the NRSROs, however, did not result in a completely successful 
dodge of the regulatory bullet. On February 2, 2009, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (the "SEC" or the "Commission") 
released new rules governing certain aspects of the conduct of 
NRSROs in their rating of structured securities and other related debt 
instruments.97 According to the SEC's release, these new 
requirements are intended to "address concerns about the integrity of 
. . . credit rating procedures and methodologies,"98 as well as 
"increase the transparency of the NRSROs' rating methodologies, 
strengthen the NRSROs' disclosure of ratings performance, prohibit 
the NRSROs from engaging in certain practices that create conflicts 
of interest, and enhance the NRSROs' recordkeeping and reporting 
obligations to assist the Commission in performing its regulatory and 
oversight functions. "99 
The SEC rule amendments, the product of much negotiation 
and compromise, require that NRSROs provide improved disclosure 
of information upon which ratings are based, as well as disclosure of 
"performance measurements statistics and the procedures and 
methodologies."10°For example, CRAs are prohibited from issuing a 
INVESTORS SERVICE, MOODY'S CREDIT POLICY: STRENGTHENING 
ANALYTICAL QUALITY AND TRANSPARENCY 6-7 (Aug. 2008). 
95 See, e.g., MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, supra note 94, at 7 ("Analysts 
are not compensated on the basis of the financial performance of their 
business unit or on the fees derived from the ratings that they oversee."). 
96 See, e.g., id. ("Moody's has separated all non-rating services from the 
credit rating agency."). 
97 Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 59,342, 74 Fed. Reg. 6,456 (Apr. 
10, 2009). 
98 ld. 
99 !d. at 6,456-57. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2 (2009). 
100 Specifically, the instructions require an NRSRO to provide descriptions 
of the following areas (as applicable): policies for determining whether to 
initiate a credit rating; sources of information used in determining credit 
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rating on a structured product unless information about the 
underlying assets is made available. 101 Moreover, all of an agency's 
ratings and subsequent rating actions must be made publicly 
available, although the CRAs fought for and received a six-month lag 
time for the release of such information. 102 Performance statistics 
must also be published for one, three, and ten years within each 
rating category, as must information about how frequently credit 
ratings are reviewed. 103 In addition, the amendments addressed the 
issue of conflicts of interest by prohibiting CRAs from structuring 
the same financial products that they rate, and by separating the fee 
negotiation from the rating process. 
The SEC, however, tabled a number of proposed measures in 
an effort to collect further public comment. These measures include a 
requirement that NRSROs to publicly disclose the specific 
information they used to arrive at or to monitor the rating of 
structured securities. The proposal requires (i) the NRSRO to 
disclose to other NRSROs that it was rating the security; (ii) the 
issuer, sponsor or underwriter to represent that it was giving the same 
information to the other NRSROs in order for them to determine a 
rating, and (iii) NRSROs to certify annually how it is using the 
information they seek and receive with respect to structured finance 
products from other NRSROs. These proposed rules would apply 
when an issuer, sponsor, or underwriter hires an NRSRO to rate a 
structured finance product. Other proposals still out for further public 
comment include changes in the rating symbols for structured 
ratings; the models and metrics used to determine credit ratings; policies for 
using credit ratings of other agencies in determining credit ratings for 
securities or money market instruments; procedures for interacting with the 
management of a rated obligor or issuer; the structure and voting process of 
credit ratings committee; procedures for informing rated obligors or issuers 
about credit rating decisions and for appeals of final or pending rating 
decisions; procedures for reviewing credit ratings; and procedures to 
suspend the maintenance of a credit rating. 74 Fed. Reg. 6,456 n.34. 
101 !d. at n.l84. 
102 The time lag was, according to the SEC, a response to concerns about 
loss of revenues that NRSROs earn from selling their data packages. The 
SEC is still considering how to improve public disclosure on subscriber paid 
credit ratings. !d. at 6,462. 
106 NRSROs must publish a random sample of 10 percent of the ratings 
histories paid credit ratings "in each class of credit ratings for which it is 
registered and has issued 500 or more issuer-paid credit ratings." New 
ratings should be reflected in the sample within six months. !d. at 6,469. 
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finance products and amendments designed to reduce SEC rule 
reliance on NRSRO ratings. 
C. The New York Attorney General's Settlement 
The "voluntary" reforms 104 followed on the heels of an 
extensive investigation of credit rating agency practices with respect 
to residential mortgage-backed securities conducted by the New 
York Office of the Attorney General, under the supervision of the 
Investor Protection Bureau chief. This investigation concluded with a 
settlement agreement dated as of June 2008 pursuant to which each 
NRSRO agreed to implement a number of reforms to their rating of 
residential mortgage-backed securities. 105 In accord with the terms 
of the settlement, NRSROs are required to (i) establish a fee-for­
service structure, whereby rating agencies will be compensated for 
determining a rating, regardless of whether they are ultimately hired 
to deliver the rating; (ii) disclose information about all mortgage­
backed securitizations submitted by investment banks for initial 
review, so investors are able to determine whether issuers sought any 
rating they ultimately decided not to use; (iii) establish criteria for the 
review of mortgage loan originators and their lending processes, and 
publicly disclose such information; (iv) establish criteria for the 
collection of information about the mortgages backing the rated 
MBSs, and publicly disclose such information; (v) conduct an annual 
self-critique of their residential mortgage-backed securities rating 
practices, to identity and remediate practices that could compromise 
their independent opinions; and (vi) require that investment banks 
and other financially responsible parties provide representations and 
warranties with respect to the loans underlying rated residential 
mortgage-backed securities. 106 
VI. The Opportunity in the Rating Agency Crisis 
It is popularly understood that the Chinese word "fl2:f~" 
translated as "crisis," is composed of two characters: one for 
104 See Part V.A, supra. 

105 Press Release, Office ofthe Attorney General ofthe State ofNew York, 

Attorney General Cuomo Announces Landmark Reform Agreements with 

the Nation's Three Principal Credit Rating Agencies (June 5, 2008). 

106 !d. 
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"danger" and one for "opportunity." 107 Crisis provides the chance for 
change and growth-which is the opportunity. Periods of crisis may, 
however, lead some to experience the risk of regression, stagnation, 
or even obsolescence-the danger. The translation of these two 
component characters offers a concise description of the two 
pathways currently open to credit rating agencies. 
The voluntary measures adopted by the rating agencies, the 
SEC's recently-adopted amendments, the proposed rules, and the 
terms of the Attorney General's settlement address many of the 
points of central concern that have surfaced in the recent market 
turmoil. However, they do so in a piecemeal, fragmented fashion: 
they were developed reactively, not proactively, and it shows. A 
comprehensive reform of the regulatory landscape is called for. 
Any reform initiative must be measured by how robustly 
three central objectives are met: (i) increasing the reliability and 
accuracy of ratings of MBSs, ABSs, and derivative securities; (ii) 
increasing competition within the market in which rating agencies 
operate and decreasing incentives for behavior that implicates 
conflicting interests and loyalties; and (iii) enhancing market 
107 The earliest citations found by linguist and lexographer Benjamin 
Zimmer, Research Associate, Institute for Research in Cognitive Science, 
University of Pennsylvania, were published in the Chinese Recorder, an 
English-language newspaper for missionaries in China. In January, 1938, an 
unsigned editorial entitled "The Challenge of Unusual Times" read: 
The Chinese term for crisis is "danger-opportunity" 
(!Btl). Without the danger there cannot arise the 
opportunity. It is very fitting then that in this time of 
"danger-opportunity" there should go forth a call to a 
Forward Movement in the Christian Church in China. 
Benjamin Zimmer, Crisis = Danger + Opportunity: The Plot Thickens, 
LANGUAGE LOG, Mar. 27, 2007, http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/ 
archives/004343.html (citing The Challenge of Unusual Times, LXIX 
CHINESE RECORDER 2 (1938)). Professor Zimmer observes that this 
translation is not without its detractors. See Victor H. Mair, Danger + 
Opportunity t- Crisis: How a Misunderstanding About Chinese Characters 
Has Led Many Astray, Plnyln.info, http://www.pinyin.info/chinese/ 
crisis.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2009) ("There is a widespread 
misperception, particularly among the New Age sector, that the Chinese 
word for 'crisis' is composed of elements that signify 'danger' and 
'opportunity.'"). 
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transparency, 108 thereby offering means for investors to conduct 
independent diligence ofMBSs', ABSs', and CDOs' credit quality in 
order to decrease exclusive reliance on rating agency opinions. 
One way of ensuring these objectives are met going forward 
is to require CRAs to have far greater accountability. An independent 
and expert oversight board must be created, with the authority and 
funding to comprehensively oversee the rating process. Moreover, 
specific penalties must be built into the internal or external regulatory 
structure for getting a rating wrong. Penalties, such as the loss of 
NRSRO status if default rate of rated securities exceeded certain 
specified levels, or the forfeiture of a fee if a default rate exceeds 
certain benchmarks, 109 would alter the culture and behavior in the 
current system. Lifting the exemption from civil liability for 
negligent, reckless, or fraudulent behavior would go even further and 
put rating agencies on an equal footing with other players in the 
financial markets. 
The financial crisis may be partly attributed to a failure of 
imagination-no one in the financial markets or in government ever 
thought that market conditions could get this bad. Rating agencies 
also suffered from a failure of imagination. Going forward, analysts 
must now ask the "what if?" question in order to factor in to risk 
assessments what is essentially the unknown. 
Of course, in order to dig completely out of the current MBS, 
ABS, and CDO-rooted crisis, policy and regulatory reforms must not 
be limited to rating agencies; fundamental measures must be put in 
place to alter the incentives driving all the participants in the 
financial markets. Securitizing originators must be required to retain 
a significant portion of the securities they originate. In this way, 
credit-underwriting risk is shared, and not simply transferred. 
Disclosure and oversight of derivative transactions, including credit 
default swaps, must be regulated, if at all, under federal securities 
108 See, e.g., Press Release, Standard & Poor's, Remarks for Deven Sharma, 

FDIC Conference 16-17 (Jul. 9, 2008), available at http://www2.standard 

andpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/Sharma _FDIC _Final. pdf) ("While the wide 

range of structured finance products-think COOs of ABS, ABCP conduits, 

or HELOCs-have found eager buyers, it also appears that not all of these 

buyers fully understood what they were buying. Due diligence is, of course, 

ultimately the responsibility of the investor. But I also believe that the 

issuers have a responsibility to be transparent regarding the risks associated 

with the assets they are securitizing."). 

109 Statement of Professor Coffee, supra note 56, at 14. 
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laws and not simply by state insurance statutes. Moreover, pricing 
models for mortgage- and asset-backed securities must more 
accurately reflect the market reality that cash flows and the value of 
collateral, including real estate, cyclically fall-as well as rise. 
CRAs must resist re-entering the race to the bottom in search 
of extraordinary short-term profits. Moreover, they must make an 
effort to alter market norms so that there is a return to the idea that a 
rating is a valuable complement to, and not a proxy for, an investor's 
own due diligence. 110 In the past, rating agencies disclaimed that to 
be the case, while at the same time they contributed to the culture of 
absolute reliance on their opinions. 
Given the adverse position in which rating agencies find 
themselves-what may fairly be categorized as an abyss-this 
moment is ripe for consideration of how they can avoid getting 
ensnared in blinding market bubbles in the future. Every assumption, 
process, and methodology employed must be questioned and 
examined. We have to look at the issue of regulation (both self­
imposed and external) differently. We must spend more time 
imagining future scenarios and less time relying on information from 
the past. The question becomes, "How do we make certain that this 
moment is tantamount to 'the storm of the century,' rather than 
simply a dip in the future cycle of extreme booms and busts?" 
VIL Conclusion 
Credit rating agencies' faulty and inadequate pricing and risk 
assessments have had catastrophic and wide-ranging systemic 
effects. One of the consequences of the 2008-2009 financial crisis 
has been the decimation of rating agencies' reputational capita-the 
most valuable assets they have. Their credibility in the market must 
be re-established and their integrity restored in order to regain 
investors' and the public's confidence in their opinions. Their 
behavior and role in the markets must be dramatically re-imagined. 
We now have the opportunity to address CRAs role in the financial 
crisis and attend to their deficiencies in process, methodology and 
policy. CRAs will either support a more robust regulatory 
infrastructure and dramatic modification of their practice and emerge 
from the ashes, or they will become irrelevant. The question that 
110 See generally id. at 15 ("[R]atings speak to credit risk, and credit risk 
only. They don't talk to suitability, price, duration or any of the myriad of 
other factors investors need to look at before buying a security."). 
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remains, however, is whether the 2008-2009 financial crisis will 
serve as an opportunity for genuine and meaningful reform for the 
credit rating agencies, lll or, will it result in the regression, 
stagnation, and the ultimate obsolescence of CRAs? 
111 It has been said that it is difficult to predict an event not yet experienced. 
The 2008-2009 financial crisis is (we hope) a once in a lifetime event. 

